For many years, the U.S. government regularly published a pamphlet called the Defense Planning Guidance, summarizing its official position on grand strategy. Most Guidance’s were rather bland documents, but in February 1992, just two months after the Soviet Union dissolved, the committee charged with drafting a new Guidance did something outrageous. It told the truth.
What it drafted was a how-to-guide for globocops. While the United States could not “assume responsibility for righting every wrong,” it conceded, “we will retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations.” This meant accomplishing one big thing:
Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union and Southwest Asia.
Ian Morris, War What Is It Good For
Some say President-elect Trump’s rejection of the Trans Pacific Partnership and threats to pull out of the Paris climate accord would hand global leadership over to China. Diane and a panel of guests discuss how China’s global role could expand during the Trump presidency.
4:05November 24, 20165:09 AM ET
STEVE INSKEEP, HOST:
The Constitution prohibits a president from receiving favors or financial gain from foreign powers, which has never been much of an issue until now. Donald Trump, the president-elect, has business interests around the globe. He faces calls in this country to separate his personal and public affairs, but as president-elect has acknowledged already talking business and politics in the same conversation. Let's talk about what this means when it comes to China. For that, we go to NPR's Rob Schmitz, who is in Shanghai, China's business capital. Hi, Rob.
ROB SCHMITZ, BYLINE: Good morning, Steve.
INSKEEP: How far back does Trump's business history in China go?
SCHMITZ: Well, Trump has had his eye on China's fast growing property market since 2008. That was the year he signed a deal with Evergrande Real Estate Group. That's one of China's largest developers. And their plan was to build an office tower in Guangzhou, a city near Hong Kong. The deal was going to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, but it fell apart when Evergrande pulled out after the global recession hit China.
INSKEEP: OK, bad timing there. Did anything else work?
SCHMITZ: Well, like many prospective business deals here in China, his business deals follow the sort of familiar one-step-forward-two-steps-back approach. In 2012, Trump's hotel business opened its first Asia office down the street from me here in Shanghai. They hired a CEO to manage operations, and a year later they signed a deal with China's State Grid Corporation. That's the company that provides electricity to nearly all of China. The deal was to build what was called a, quote, unquote, "major development in Beijing worth a billion dollars."
But that deal was scrapped when Chinese authorities opened a corruption investigation into State Grid, alleging it had illegally used public land for the project. When we called the CEO for Trump's hotel business here in Shanghai, he told NPR that he no longer works at the company. And a visit to its office showed that Trump's Asia branch has been closed for some time. Despite all of that, on October 20 just a few weeks prior to the election, Trump Hotel Collection CEO Eric Danziger showed up to a hospitality conference in Hong Kong, and that's where he told the Hong Kong newspaper that Trump Hotel Collection plans to build 20 to 30 Trump Hotels in major Chinese cities in the coming years.
INSKEEP: Rob, when you talk about huge Chinese companies with names like State Grid, are those effectively Chinese government-owned entities? Is Trump doing business with the government of China here?
SCHMITZ: Yes. Like many business owners from the United States or anywhere else coming into China, it's difficult to avoid doing business with state-owned enterprises because they do effectively control much of the market. And so even the land - you know, Trump is a real estate developer - even the land in China is all owned by the state. So it's almost impossible not to have any of your business connected to the state in some way or another.
INSKEEP: And it's also been reported by The New York Times that he owes hundreds of millions of dollars in loans to the Bank of China. Is that also state-owned?
SCHMITZ: Yes, of course. That is one of the big banks of China, and he owes that for a building that was built in Manhattan.
INSKEEP: OK, so given everything you've said, Rob Schmitz, how might it affect China's relations with this incoming president, particularly since, so far he's declined to draw a bright line between his business and public affairs?
SCHMITZ: Well, I mean, the fact that the incoming president of the largest economy on the planet has expressed an interest in building two dozen hotels on state-owned land in China puts China's leadership in a potentially powerful position with President-Elect Trump. If, for example, Trump as president labels China a currency manipulator, as he's promised to do on his first day of office, and if he makes good on his promise to impose tariffs on Chinese imports, it's very possible, if not probable, that China's government would block Trump's business interests inside their country.
If, on the other hand, he pushes forward policies that are favorable to the Chinese government, that could easily clear the way for those 20 to 30 Trump Hotels his company wants to build in China. Either way, this threatens to put China in a more powerful position in its negotiations with the president of the United States. And it puts the U.S. interests that as president he will vow to fight for at potential risk.
INSKEEP: That's NPR's Rob Schmitz in Shanghai. Rob, thanks very much.
SCHMITZ: Thanks, Steve.
Copyright © 2016 NPR. http://www.npr.org/2016/11/24/503236237/trumps-hotels-in-china-coul...
Ian Morris in War What Is It Good For? Declares that despite the globocop’s travails in Southwest Asia, it is increasingly looking as if the region where it is failing most seriously at preventing the rise of strategic rivals is actually East Asia. Along the continent's outer rim--the chain of islands from Japan to Jakarta--the struggle has generally gone well. In some ways, in fact, developments in outer-rim East Asia have been very like those in Western Europe, Japan, like West Germany was demilitarized and occupied in 1945 and then partially remilitarized and admitted to world markets under American supervision. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore all followed suit, turning into economic giants.
East Asia's rim, however, has been a different story. The People's Republic of China controls not only thousands of miles of inner-rim coastline but also a great swath of the Eurasian heartland, putting it in much the same position that Germany would have been in had it won either of the world wars. Every year, $5 trillion in goods passes through the South China Sea, investing not just the Strait of Malacca but also tiny specks of rock such as the Spratly and Paracel Islands with huge strategic significance.
By the time Mao Zedong seized power in 1949, it looked as if the successive outer-rim globocops had encircled China with island chains that could strangle its economy. However, by 1972 Mao invited Nixon to China. "This was the week that changed the world," Nixon grandiloquently announced, but in fact it was only after Mao was safely dead that saner counsels really prevailed in China.
By the late 1970s, China's economy needed to grow by 8 percent every year for decades to avoid famines even worse than the ones it had already endured. Recognizing this, Deng Xiaoping opened China to the world economy. Since China could not break the island chains by force (it had virtually no navy, and the vast People's Liberation Army, old-fashioned at the best of times, had come close to collapse during the Cultural Revolution), this meant making nice with the globocop.
John Higgs in Stranger Than We Can Imagine (2015) witnesses that after Neoliberalism fully established itself in the mid-1970s in the West, and at the retreat of the American Dream, which had promised a future better than the past, China began its phenomenal rise. Deng Xiaoping became Paramount Leader of the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978, in the aftermath of the death of Mao. Deng began the process of introducing a managed form of capitalism into China.
The impacts of this would not be felt immediately, but the availability of cheaper Chinese labor for Western corporations would lead to the disappearance of well-paid Western manufacturing jobs, as well as destabilizing trade imbalances. This process of globalization also led to the disappearance of corporate taxes from government balance sheets. Corporations increasingly embraced globalization and reimagined themselves as stateless entities in no way beholden to the nations that formed them.
CHINA PAYING THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRICE FOR SUCCESS
Morris posits that Deng's policies unleashed environmental devastation and rampant corruption, but they also delivered the goods. During the 1990s, a staggering 150 million farmers fled the impoverished interior for factories near the coast, effectively creating a new Chicago every year. Moving to a city typically raised a worker's income by 50 percent, and because the new urbanites still needed to eat, those who stayed on the farm and sold food to the cities also saw wages rise by 6 percent per year. By 2006, China's economy was nine times bigger than it had been when Mao died thirty years earlier.
This was/is only the beginning. Between 1976 and 2006, China's share of the world's economic output more than tripled, from 4.5 to 15.4 percent. Across the same years the American share declined, and although the United States was still ahead, producing 19.5 percent of the world's GDP, there was no denying that the globocop now had a rival.
The United States let China become such a rival for the same reason that the United Kingdom let Germany and the United States itself become rivals in the late nineteenth century: it made the globocop richer too. In fact, China's rise was an extraordinarily good financial deal for America. Because Chinese imports were so inexpensive, most American workers saw their living standards improve, even though their wages were stagnant; and because China lent much of its profits back to the United States by buying a trillion dollars' worth of Treasury bonds, Americans never ran out of money to keep buying Chinese imports. As a final touch, cheap Chinese goods exerted deflationary pressures that prevented cheap Chinese credit from setting off rampant inflation. Everybody won.
So mutually rewarding was the relationship between the globocop and its Asian friend that the historian Niall Ferguson and economist Moritz Schularick christened it "Chimeria"--a marriage of China and America. In economics as in strategy, every action has a culminating point, beyond which, Clausewitz observed, "the scale turns and the reaction follows." In 2009, a joke was making the rounds: "After the Tiananmen Square crisis in 1989, capitalism saved China. After 2009 China saved capitalism."
TPP AND THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBOCOP
Be careful what you wish for, the saying goes. China's part in helping to save capitalism made "the China Price" into the scariest three words for American diplomats as well as industrialists. China has become a massive body in the financial firmament, and its economic gravity is pulling the Western Pacific into a Sinocentric orbit. Before 2009 was over, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan had all made very public overtures to Beijing. Vital links in the island chain around China were close to snapping.
The big question was what this would mean for the globocop. Not much, said Beijing, which since 2004, had been describing China's growing influence as a "Peaceful Rise." China, it insisted, was joining--not challenging--the American world-system and would accept its rules. And just in case "Peaceful Rise" still sounded alarming, Beijing softened its image still further in 2008 by changing the label to "Peaceful Development." This, spokesmen explained, was part of an ancient Chinese strategic culture, rooted in Confucianism. Rather than using force to resolve disputes, China had always relied on virtue, showing by its humane example that cooperation would make everyone better-off.
Americans have often made similar claims about their own policies. As long ago as 1821, John Quincy Adams argued that the United State made its mark on the world through the "benignant sympathy of her example." But despite these fine words, the United States has regularly resorted to force, and throughout history, in fact, geopolitical shifts on the scale of China's takeoff have always been accompanied by massive violence.
Europe's rise between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries had involved a Five Hundred Years' War, and the shift in the economic center of gravity from Europe to North America between 1914 and 1945 set off a storm of steel. Perhaps this time will be different, but if drawing the Western Pacific into a Sinocentric orbit also means drawing the region out of the American orbit, the consequences for the globocop could be fatal--very like, perhaps, those Britain would have suffered if Germany had defeated France in 1914 and shut it out of a western European customs union.
Martin Jacques in When China Rules The World: The End Of The Western World And The Birth Of A New Global Order (2009) gives an answers to Donald Trump's rhetoric to "make America great again" at the expense of China. Like Morris he refers to the United States role as globocop. Jacques posits that following 9/11, the United States not only saw itself as the sole superpower but attempted to establish a new global role which reflected that pre-eminence. The neoconservative think-tank Project for the New American Century, established in 1997 by, amongst others, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz [chaired by William Kristol], adopted a statement of principles which articulated the new doctrine and helped prepare the ground for the Bush administration:
"As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world's preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interest?"
The new century dawned with the world deeply aware of and preoccupied by the prospect of what appeared to be overwhelming American power. The neoconservatives chose to interpret the world through the prism of the defeat of the Soviet Union and the overwhelming military superiority enjoyed by the United States, rather than in terms of the underlying trend towards economic multipolarity, which was downplayed.
Failing to comprehend the significance of deeper economic trends, as well as misreading the situation in Iraq, the Bush administration overestimated American power and thereby overplayed its hand, with the consequence that its policies had exactly the opposite effect to that which had been intended: instead of enhancing the US's position in the world, Bush's foreign policy seriously weakened it. The neoconservative position represented a catastrophic misreading of history.
Military and political power rest on economic strength. Quoting Paul Kennedy, Jacque declares, the ability of nations to exercise and sustain global hegemony has ultimately depended on their productive capacity. America's present superpower status is a product of its rapid economic growth between 1870 and 1950 and the fact that during the second half of the twentieth century, it was the world's largest and often most dynamic economy.
This economic strength underpinned and made possible its astonishing political, cultural and military power from 1945 onwards. According to the economic historian Angus Maddison, the US economy accounted for 8.8 percent of global GDP in 1870. There then followed a spectacular period of growth during which the proportion rose to 18.9 percent in 1913 and 27.3 percent in 1950. This was followed by a slow and steady decline to 22.1 percent in 1973, with the figure now hovering around 20 percent, and so forth.
If Britain took its place alongside the United States in Iraq, its military contribution was largely cosmetic. The precondition for being a hegemonic power, including the ability or otherwise to preside over a formal or informal empire, is economic strength, In the long run at least, it is a merciless measure.
Notwithstanding this, imperial powers in decline are almost invariably in denial of the fact. That was the case with Britain from 1918 onwards and, to judge by the behavior of the Bush administration (though perhaps not Obama's)--which failed to read the runes, preferring to believe that the US was about to rule the world in a new American century when the country was actually in decline and on the eve of a world in which it would find its authority considerably diminished--the US may well make the same mistake, perhaps on a much grander scale.
The financial meltdown in 2008 belatedly persuaded a growing number of American commentators that the United States might after all be in decline, but that was still a far cry from a general recognition of the extent and irreversibility of that decline and how it might diminish American power and influence in the future.
The burden of maintaining a huge global military presence, with over 800 American bases dotted around the world, has been one of the causes of the US's enormous current account deficit, which in 2006 accounted for 6.5 percent of US GDP. In future the American economy will find it increasingly difficult to support such a military commitment. The United States has ceased to be a major manufacturer or a large-scale exporter of manufactured goods, having steadily ceded that position to East Asia. In recent times it has persistently been living beyond its means: the government has been spending more than it saves, households have been doing likewise, and since 1982, apart from one year, the country has been buying more from foreigners than it sells to them, with consequent huge current account deficit and a growing volume of IOUs. Current account deficits can of course be rectified, but only by reducing growth and accepting a lower level of economic activity.
Growing concern on the part of foreign institutions about these deficits led to a steady fall in the value of the dollar until 2008, and this could well be resumed at some point, further threatening the dollar's role as the world's reserve currency and American financial power. Moody's warned in 2008 that the US faced the prospect within a decade of losing its top-notch triple-A credit rating [which the T-Party Congress did not seem to give a damn about], first granted to US government debt when it was assessed in 1917, unless it took radical action to curb government expenditure. And this was before the financial meltdown in 2008, which, with the huge taxpayer-funded government bail-out of the financial sector, will greatly increase the size of the US national debt.
This is not to suggest that, in the short run, the US will be required to reduce its military expenditure for reasons of financial restraint: indeed, giving the position that the US military occupies in the national psyche, and the primary emphasis that US foreign policy has traditionally placed on military power, that seems most unlikely. Being an imperial power, however, is a hugely expensive business and, peering into the future, as its relative economic power declines, the United States will no longer be able to sustain the military commitments and military superiority that it presently enjoys.
PRESIDENT TRUMP FACES A NEW KIND OF WORLD
Jacque insists that we stand on the eve of a different kind of world, but comprehending it is difficult: we are so accustomed to dealing with the paradigms and parameters of the contemporary would that we inevitably take them for granted, believing that they are set in concrete rather than themselves being the subject of longer-run cycles of the historical change, [as is evident from Trump supporters]. Given that American global hegemony has held sway for almost a lifetime, and that Western supremacy transcends many lifetimes, this is not surprising.
We are so used to the world being Western, even American, that we have little idea what it would be like if it were not. The West, moreover, has strong vested interest in the world being cast in its image, because this brings multifarious benefits. As a matter of course, hegemonic powers seek to project their values and institutions on to subordinate nations and the latter, in response, will, depending on circumstances, adapt or genuflect towards their ways; if they don't hegemonic powers generally seek to impose those values and arrangements on them, even in extremis by force. For reasons of both mindset and interest, therefore, the United States, and the West more generally, finds it difficult to visualize, or accept, a world that involves a major and continuing diminution in its influence.
Take globalization as an example. The dominant Western view has been that globalization is a process by which the rest of the world becomes--and --should become--increasingly Westernized, with the adoption of free markets, the import of Western capital, privatization, the rule of law, human rights regimes and democratic norms. Much political effort, indeed, has been expended by the West towards this end. Competition, the market and technology, meanwhile, have been powerful and parallel pressures fostering the kind of convergence and homogeneity which is visible in many developing cites around the world in the form of high-rise buildings, expressways, mobile phones, and much else.
There are however, strong countervailing forces, rooted in the specific history and culture of each society, that serve to shape indigenous institutions like the family, the government, and the company and which pull in exactly the opposite direction. Furthermore, as countries grow more prosperous, they become increasingly self-confident about their own culture and history, and thereby less inclined to ape the West.
Far from being a one-way process, globalization is rather more complex: the United States may have been the single most influential player, exerting enormous power in successive rounds of global trade talks, for example, but the biggest winner has been East Asia and the greatest single beneficiary China. The process of globalization involves an unending tension between on the one hand the forces of convergence, including Western political pressure, and on the other hand the counter-trend toward divergence and indigenization, [ISIS].
CHINA AND THE END OF WHITE SUPREMACY
8:177, 20164:18 PM ET
KELLY MCEVERS, HOST:
The new chief strategist for President-elect Donald Trump once said a website he used to run, Breitbart News, is a platform for the so-called alt-right. We're about to hear more about that movement from the man who says he came up with the term alt-right. His name is Richard Spencer, and in 2008, he began arguing there should be an alternative to George W. Bush-era Republicans and conservatives.
Richard Spencer now runs a small think tank that pushes alt-right ideas. To be clear, the alt-right movement is also a white nationalist movement that's associated with racism, misogyny and anti-Semitism. What the alt-right wants, Spencer says, is an awakening of identity politics, meaning white identity politics.
The alt-right used to exist mostly on the Internet, but with the rise of Donald Trump and his chief strategist, Steve Bannon, the movement is starting to hold conferences where hundreds of people attend. Spencer and others in the alt-right movement were suspended from Twitter this week. But now that Trump has been elected, Spencer says he believes the alt-right will continue to grow.
RICHARD SPENCER: This is the first time we've really entered the mainstream, and we're not going away. I mean this is just the beginning. And I'm very excited.
MCEVERS: Just a warning here. There are words and phrases and ideas in the next seven minutes that many people will find offensive, even hateful. But because this group has influence, we think you should hear what the alt-right is and what it wants from a Trump administration. So I ask Spencer that, and he said his end goal is a white ethno state sometime in the future.
SPENCER: What I would ultimately want is this ideal of a safe space effectively for Europeans. This is a big empire that would accept all Europeans. It would be a place for Germans. It would be a place for Slavs. It would be a place for Celts. It would be a place for white Americans and so on.
For something like that to happen and really for Europeans to survive and thrive in this very difficult century that we're going to be experiencing, we have to have a sense of consciousness. We're going to have to have that sense of identity.
MCEVERS: Going forward, should only white European people be considered U.S. citizens?
SPENCER: Well, no, I mean the citizenship of the United States - like, this is not something that can be changed right away. So I mean I think we need to differentiate identity and citizenship.
MCEVERS: So in your idea, like, there's a United States of America where different people still have citizenship but they're living in separate enclaves; they're living in places where they are kept separate from one another.
SPENCER: What I'm saying is that Europeans defined America. They defined what it is. Of course there are people who are non-European who are here, who are citizens and so on. What I would...
MCEVERS: Who many would argue also defined America.
SPENCER: Sure, and they did to a certain degree. But European people were the indispensable central people that defined this nation socially and politically and culturally and demographically obviously.
I care about us more. That's all I'm saying. But I respect identitarians of other races. And I actually can see eye to eye with them in a way that your average conservative can't.
MCEVERS: But you also believe that people of different races inherently do not get along. Isn't that right?
SPENCER: I think world history believes that (laughter). I mean I don't - it's not just my opinion. I don't see very many counterexamples.
MCEVERS: So you ride the subway in New York City. And you're sitting in a subway car, and you're looking at people from all over everywhere. And nobody's punching each other. Nobody's stabbing anyone. Everyone's going about their life, going to work, you know? You don't see that as, like, a way where people are getting along?
SPENCER: Do we really like each other? Do we really love each other? Do we really have a sense of community in that subway car? What I see are a lot of...
MCEVERS: Or a cul-de-sac or in kindergarten.
SPENCER: Whenever many different races are in the same school, what will happen is that there'll be a natural segregation at lunchtime, at PE, at - in terms of after-school play.
MCEVERS: Richard Spencer's views are obviously not easy to hear, but we do think they're important to hear because of the link between the alt-right and Donald Trump's team. I asked Richard Spencer what policies he's pushing for - natural conservation, he said, a foreign policy that's friendlier to Russia and this.
SPENCER: Immigration is the most obvious one. And I think we need to get beyond thinking about immigration just in terms of illegal immigration. Illegal immigration is not nearly as damaging as legal immigration. Legal immigration - they're here to stay. Their children are here and so on.
And I think a really reasonable and I think palatable policy proposal would be for Donald Trump to say, look; we've had immigration in the past. It's brought some fragmentation. It's brought division. But we need to become a people again. And for us to do that, we're going to need to take a break from mass immigration. And we're going to need to preference people who are going to fit in, who are more like us. That is European immigration.
MCEVERS: You know, how likely do you think it is that some of these policies that you want to see happen will happen?
SPENCER: What I want is influence. And sometimes influence can be invisible. If we can get these ideas out there, if people can see the compelling and powerful nature of them, I think we really can change policy.
MCEVERS: I just want to go down a list of things. And you tell me if they are OK or not OK.
MCEVERS: Graffiti that says make America white again.
SPENCER: I don't - look; graffiti is illegal, but...
MCEVERS: The slogan make America white again.
SPENCER: I don't have a huge problem with that I mean that people...
SPENCER: ...Are just expressing their opinion.
SPENCER: A swastika is an ancient symbol. I don't - like, you know, if you're asking me, do I have a problem with people expressing themselves and maybe, you know...
MCEVERS: With a swastika.
SPENCER: People want to express themselves. They can do whatever they want.
MCEVERS: So that's an OK - wearing white robes or hoods like the KKK.
SPENCER: Look. I'm - you're not going to get me to condemn any of this because you haven't said anything that is really fundamentally illegal or immoral. I might not agree with some people. I might not like this. I might like that, not like that. But the fact is these are people expressing themselves. I'm not going to condemn any of that.
MCEVERS: Do you agree with those expressions?
SPENCER: I agree with people who want to get in touch with their identity as a European. That can take a number of different forms. I don't support any kind of physical threats or anything like that. I think that does cross the line.
But in terms of people coming to terms with who they are, I don't oppose it. And I actually would respect - deeply respect the right of non-white people to try to understand themselves and to express themselves as they see fit.
MCEVERS: What about Republicans in particular?
SPENCER: Not a fan.
SPENCER: Well, I like their voters. Like, the voters are great. I - the fact that they just chose Donald Trump - that is great. I love them. In terms of Republican operatives, in terms of the conservative movement - not a fan.
MCEVERS: I guess I'm thinking of just Republicans in general - like, people maybe who did - who also voted for Donald Trump but who will say, you know, that your views are racist and are extreme and don't have a place in this country. How do you deal with them?
SPENCER: If I had told you in 1985 that we should have gay marriage in this country, you probably would have laughed at me. And I think most people would have. Or at least - at the very least, you would have been a bit confused, and you would have told me, oh that's ridiculous. The fact is, opinions do change. People's consciousness does change. Paradigms are meant to be broken. That's what the alt-right is doing.
MCEVERS: That was Richard Spencer, the leader of the so-called alt-right, a white nationalist movement that supported Donald Trump. Spencer says he is not in contact with the Trump transition team. We asked the Trump team to comment about links between Chief Strategist Steve Bannon and the alt-right, but we did not hear back. http://www.npr.org/2016/11/17/502476139/were-not-going-away-alt-rig...
Copyright © 2016 NPR.
In 1995, futurist Jean Gimpel in The End of the Future predicted the rise of China and the decent of the West. Gimpel writes an homage to China as the last page of his book:
But we should take heed of the fact that deindustrialization will mainly happen in the West and in the former Soviet Union, and that this dramatic trend will mark the end of 500 years of European domination of the world. In a very pertinent book, Pierre Lellouche wrote in 1992 that when the USA and the Soviet Union were confronting each other, mankind was witnessing the encounter of two ideologies, the democratic and the Marxist, created by our White reigning civilization. When capitalism and democracy collapses in the West, as [Gimpel] predicts it will following the bankruptcy of our financial system after the disintegration of Marxism in the Soviet Union, we will very possibly be witnessing the twilight of the White race--provisionally we hope.
As is now generally recognized, the center of world trade has moved from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In 1982, the volume of trade across the Pacific overtook that across the Atlantic. The developing counties in the Far East grew in 1993 by 7.4 percent compared with the world's 0.6 percent. Nevertheless, when Wall Street crashes, triggered off perhaps by a sharp fall of shares in Tokyo, Hong Kong or Singapore, the Pacific Basin will suffer an economic deceleration. But in the long run the Far East will recover progressively, achieving world economic supremacy while the former countries of our one glorious civilization will become, in their turn, developing countries.
China will progressively dominate the Pacific Basin and beyond and, for the second time in her long history, she will have entered an era of growth in which her psychological drive and her technological evolution will rise in parallel curves. China is at the beginning of a cycle that could last a millennium, while Western Civilization stands at the end of a cycle that is already 1,000 years old.